AES-256 protects data from the moment it leaves the client, through transit, and at rest. One implementation instead of a TLS stack bolted to self-encrypting drives, with per-volume keys you hold in your own KMS.
The common approach pairs TLS for data in flight with self-encrypting drives for data at rest. Each piece works. The seam between them is the problem, because that is where plaintext lives, where two key hierarchies have to be reconciled, and where an auditor starts asking questions.
Encryption is a property of the DirectFlow client, not a service in front of the disks. That single decision is what makes the guarantee hold all the way down.
Keys live in your external key manager and are reached over KMIP v1.4 or later with mutual-certificate authentication. Directors create a key at volume creation; the client retrieves it to encrypt and decrypt. Storage nodes are never in that conversation.
Client-side encryption buys a real guarantee, and it has real consequences. Both belong on the same page.